@syncfusion/ej2-react-pdfviewer
Essential JS 2 PDF viewer Component for React
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Consistent with publish environment change during org account transition; no other malicious indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): syncfusion-javascript is the org's consolidated publisher account with 225 approved packages; transition appears legitimate. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Syncfusion publishes component suites in batches; long gaps between React wrapper updates are normal for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Syncfusion packages consistently lack provenance attestation; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-pdfviewer | AI (dependencies): Same-org Syncfusion dependency; expected peer for this React wrapper package across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-base | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.6 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.49 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.47 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.46 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.45 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.25 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.23 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.22 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.21 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.20 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.18 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.17 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.16 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.5 | 3 / 0 |
v33.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.49
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.2.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.19
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: syncfusion-javascript.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.17
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: essentialjs2.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.14
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: essentialjs2.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.