@syncfusion/ej2-react-pivotview
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): syncfusion-javascript is the org's current npm account with 230 approved packages; transition from essentialjs2 is a known org-level change. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects the account transition, not abandonment; syncfusion-javascript is actively publishing the full ej2 suite. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-pivotview | AI (dependencies): Same-org Syncfusion dependency; standard React wrapper pattern, stable across versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-base | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on re-exported packages from the Syncfusion suite. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Syncfusion does not publish with Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all their packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.49 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.47 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.25 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.22 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.21 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.20 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.18 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.16 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.5 | 3 / 0 |
v33.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.49
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.