@syncfusion/ej2-vue-schedule
Flexible scheduling library with more built-in features and enhanced customization options similar to outlook and google calendar, allowing the users to plan and manage their appointments with efficient data-binding support. for Vue
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Syncfusion account migration from essentialjs2 to syncfusion-javascript; consistent across their entire package portfolio. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects npm account switch, not abandonment; new publisher has 230 approved Syncfusion packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Syncfusion does not use Sigstore provenance; consistent across all their packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-base | AI (dependencies): Internal Syncfusion dependency; stable pattern across all ej2-vue packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-schedule | AI (dependencies): Internal Syncfusion dependency; stable pattern across all ej2-vue packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-vue-base | AI (dependencies): Internal Syncfusion dependency; stable pattern across all ej2-vue packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.47 | 3 / 0 | |
| 33.1.44 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.2.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.25 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.24 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.22 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.20 | 3 / 0 | |
| 32.1.19 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 31.2.10 | 3 / 0 |
v33.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.47
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.1.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v32.1.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v31.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.