@synnaxlabs/alamos
Distributed instrumentation for Synnax
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/instrumentation-lwMkPABv.cjs | AI (source-diff): Vite-generated CJS bundle chunk; content is readable instrumentation code, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/instrumentation-BUpiX8Rz.cjs | AI (source-diff): Vite build artifact (minified CJS chunk); content is benign instrumentation/logging code with no suspicious behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/instrumentation-CGaKhn8G.cjs | AI (source-diff): Vite build artifact (content-hash CJS chunk); minified but contains only logging/instrumentation code, no obfuscation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer added alongside CI/CD transition; consistent with legitimate org growth. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation is the expected pattern for this monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Monorepo package; publish gaps reflect upstream release cadence, not account takeover. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@synnaxlabs/x | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling dependency; stable pattern across all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.56.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.55.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.54.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.53.0 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.52.3 | 2 / 10 | |
| 0.50.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 0.49.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.48.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.47.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.46.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.45.1 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.45.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.44.2 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.44.1 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.44.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.43.0 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.42.3 | 2 / 8 | |
| 0.42.0 | 2 / 8 |
v0.56.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.55.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.53.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.52.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.50.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.49.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.48.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.47.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.46.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.45.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.45.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.44.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.44.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.44.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.43.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.42.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.