@t2000/x402
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package has no install scripts, no material changes, and publisher has strong track record. Lack of Sigstore attestation is a hygiene concern, not a security risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.9 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 5 |
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: funkii.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.