@takumi-rs/wasm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): The .wasm is the package's core deliverable, built via wasm-pack; stable across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Explained by CI publish-env change; SLSA attestation present and provenance unchanged. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get() is standard wasm-pack glue code for WASM JS bindings; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 189)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.4.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.4.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.3.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.3.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.3.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.2.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.2.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.2.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.8.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.8.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.7.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.5.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.5.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.4.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.2.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.1.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.16 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.15 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.14 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.13 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.12 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.11 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.10 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.9 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 4 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 4 |
v2.5.3
2 findingsUnanalyzed data: 1 gap(s). • pkg/takumi_wasm_bg.wasm [binary] 705df65a24d4d628
Published via CI/CD with a Sigstore attestation that VERIFIED against the pinned Sigstore trust root (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1, issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com). The attestation's sha512 subject digest matches the tarball bytes we streamed, so it describes this exact artifact. This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v2.0.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v2.0.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v2.0.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v2.0.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • pkg/takumi_wasm_bg.wasm
This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.