@tangle-network/sandbox
Client SDK for the Tangle Sandbox platform - build AI agent applications with dev containers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/sandbox-aBpWqler.d.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript .d.ts declaration file with long type lines from tsdown bundler; not obfuscated. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@tangle-network/cli-agent-registry | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep declared but not directly imported; consistent with optional/re-exported dependency pattern for this SDK. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 7 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 8 |
v0.2.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.