@tanstack/cli
TanStack CLI
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established TanStack publisher; provenance absence is a process gap, not a security signal for this org. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tanstack/create-ui | AI (dependencies): Sibling workspace package in the same TanStack monorepo; not an external unvetted dependency. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decode used to write binary scaffold template files; legitimate CLI scaffolding pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/template-Szi7-AZJ.mjs | AI (source-diff): Rolldown-bundled ESM output; same template engine, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/template-lWrIZhCQ.cjs | AI (source-diff): Rolldown-bundled output; readable source with clear template engine logic, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; this is the expected publish pattern going forward. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): kevinvandy and tkdodo are known TanStack ecosystem contributors; legitimate org expansion. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Expected artifact of switching to GitHub Actions CI publish pipeline; SLSA provenance compensates. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation for the official TanStack org. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/template-Cup47s9h.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard rolldown bundler output; readable imports and logic visible in sample. Not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/template-CkAkdP8n.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard rolldown bundler output; readable imports and logic visible in sample. Not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/template-BYtYrGPH.cjs | AI (source-diff): Rolldown-bundled template engine; readable code with comments, no encoded payloads. Stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/template-CDwR5Bk3.mjs | AI (source-diff): ESM counterpart of the same rolldown bundle; same reasoning applies. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped @tanstack package; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive with no brand impersonation intent. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@tanstack/create | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the TanStack org; expected dependency for a CLI scaffolding tool. | ai |
Versions (showing 36 of 36)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.69.1 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.69.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.68.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.67.1 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.67.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.66.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.65.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.6 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.5 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.4 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.3 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.2 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.1 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.64.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.63.1 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.63.0 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.62.5 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.62.4 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.62.3 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.62.2 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.62.1 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.62.0 | 10 / 11 | |
| 0.59.6 | 13 / 11 | |
| 0.59.0 | 13 / 11 | |
| 0.48.6 | 13 / 11 | |
| 0.48.5 | 13 / 11 | |
| 0.48.4 | 13 / 11 | |
| 0.48.2 | 13 / 11 | |
| 0.0.8 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.7 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 9 / 3 |
v0.69.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.69.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.68.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.67.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.67.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.66.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.65.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.63.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.63.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.59.6
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.59.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.48.6
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.48.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: tannerlinsley.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.48.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: tannerlinsley.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.48.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.