@tanstack/cta-ui
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-x6Tw26xR.js | AI (source-diff): Vite/React bundle output, not obfuscation; standard build artifact for this UI package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-CYZrMQfr.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite/React bundle output, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Known TanStack org maintainers, consistent with CI/CD provenance switch. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established maintainer with long, consistent release history; dormancy alone is not malicious. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-BlkQlFH3.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled vite/rollup build output (React internals visible), not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-CsHdpzhu.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled frontend asset, not true obfuscation; matches package's UI bundle purpose. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-16uOszEx.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite-minified React bundle for a UI package; not obfuscated, just minified frontend output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-nLTGZwWC.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite minified bundle for a React UI package; not obfuscated, readable code with license headers. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-dikOiXwx.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite-minified React bundle with accompanying source map; expected artifact for this UI package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/assets/index-CV3P_WqJ.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Vite-minified UI bundle for a React component library; not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tailwindcss-animate | AI (phantom-deps): Tailwind plugin referenced in config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tailwind-merge | AI (phantom-deps): Tailwind utility referenced in config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:next-themes | AI (phantom-deps): UI peer dependency referenced in config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sonner | AI (phantom-deps): UI peer dependency referenced in config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:execa | AI (phantom-deps): Used in config/build tooling context; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react | AI (phantom-deps): React is a peer/config dependency for a UI package; not directly imported in source is expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 60 of 60)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.48.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.48.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.48.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.47.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.46.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.46.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.45.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.44.3 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.44.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.44.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.44.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.43.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.43.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.41.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.41.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.40.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.37.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.37.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.36.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.28.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.27.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.27.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.26.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.26.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.25.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.25.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.25.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.24.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.24.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.23.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.23.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.23.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.22.3 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.22.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.22.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.22.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.21.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.20.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.19.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.17.5 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.17.4 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.17.3 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.17.2 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.17.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.17.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.10 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.9 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.8 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.7 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.6 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.5 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.4 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.1 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.16.0 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.15.12 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.15.11 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.15.7 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.15.6 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.15.5 | 15 / 15 | |
| 0.15.4 | 15 / 15 |
v0.48.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.48.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.47.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.46.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.46.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.45.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.44.3
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.44.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.44.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2026-01-07, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.44.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2025-12-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.43.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2025-12-18, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.43.0
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tannerlinsley) on 2025-12-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.41.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.37.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.37.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.36.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.