@taole/tw-yinsuda
yinsuda
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for this publisher/org; no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 5 |
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.