@taquito/signer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): bn.js is a well-known, widely-used big-number library; appropriate for a cryptographic signer package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:elliptic | AI (dependencies): elliptic is a standard EC cryptography library appropriate for a blockchain signer; its use here is expected and legitimate. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stablelib/hmac | AI (dependencies): @stablelib/hmac is a reputable cryptographic primitive library; expected dependency for a cryptographic signer package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stablelib/pbkdf2 | AI (dependencies): @stablelib/pbkdf2 is a reputable cryptographic primitive library; expected dependency for a cryptographic signer package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stablelib/ed25519 | AI (dependencies): @stablelib/ed25519 is a reputable Ed25519 implementation; expected dependency for a Tezos signer package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stablelib/pbkdf2 | AI (phantom-deps): Declared but not directly imported; likely used transitively or in config. Not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stablelib/sha512 | AI (dependencies): @stablelib/sha512 is a reputable cryptographic primitive library; expected dependency for a cryptographic signer package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@stablelib/nacl | AI (dependencies): @stablelib/nacl is a well-known audited NaCl crypto library; its use in a cryptographic signer package is expected and appropriate across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/bn.js | AI (phantom-deps): @types/bn.js is a TypeScript type declaration package with no runtime security implications; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 24.3.0 | 9 / 23 | |
| 24.2.0 | 14 / 28 | |
| 24.1.0 | 14 / 28 | |
| 24.0.2 | 14 / 28 | |
| 24.0.1 | 14 / 28 | |
| 24.0.0 | 13 / 28 | |
| 23.1.0 | 13 / 28 | |
| 23.0.3 | 15 / 28 |
v24.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.