@tarojs/binding-darwin-arm64
Native binding for taro
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding; the .node file is the package's sole deliverable, consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary shim packages legitimately have no deps, minimal README, and no keywords. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.6.40 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.6.39 | 0 / 0 |
v4.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.40
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.39
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-arm64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.