@tarojs/binding-darwin-x64
Native binding for taro
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended deliverable for @tarojs/binding-darwin-x64. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minimal platform-specific binary package; no deps, keywords, or verbose README is expected for this type of package. | ai |
v4.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.darwin-x64.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.6.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.