@tarojs/binding-linux-x64-musl MIT 2 versions

@tarojs/binding-linux-x64-musl

npm Repository Homepage

This is the **x86_64-unknown-linux-musl** binary for `@tarojs/taro`

Versions

MIT

License

Install Scripts

Missing

Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

yuchexuanzebindefaultleedrchankyjoqq592743779advancedcatbaosiqingzakaryliuzejiavasily.cjjhardenzheng2

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

Source	Rule	Reason	Accepted by	When
npm-metadata	bundled-binaries	AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binding package; .node binary is the intended deliverable for this Taro framework split package.	ai	2026/05/15
bogus-package	bogus-package	AI (bogus-package): No-dep, sparse-README pattern is expected for platform-specific optional binary packages in a monorepo.	ai	2026/05/15

Versions (showing 2 of 2)

Version	Deps	Published
4.2.0	0 / 0	2026-04-13
3.6.40	0 / 0	2026-04-13

v4.2.0

2 findings

HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.linux-x64-musl.node

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.6.40

2 findings

HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • taro.linux-x64-musl.node

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.