@tauri-apps/cli-win32-x64-msvc
Command line interface for building Tauri apps
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binary is the sole purpose of this package; expected and attested via SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific sub-package intentionally has no deps, minimal README, and no keywords — stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.11.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.11.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.11.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.11.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.10.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.9.4 | 0 / 0 |
v2.10.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tauri-apps-ci-user) on 2026-03-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.10.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (tauri-apps-ci-user) on 2026-02-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.9.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.9.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.