@tcswap/helpers
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-tlds | AI (semgrep): Fires on test fixture using placeholder URL 'lul.xyz'; not a real C2 or exfiltration endpoint. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.5.19 | 8 / 4 | |
| 4.5.18 | 8 / 4 | |
| 4.5.17 | 8 / 4 | |
| 4.5.16 | 8 / 4 | |
| 4.5.15 | 8 / 4 |
v4.5.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.5.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.