@tcswap/plugins
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Common for small-org packages; no additional risk signal here. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes Solana VersionedTransaction from base64 — standard Solana SDK pattern, not malicious payload handling. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.2.19 | 7 / 5 | |
| 4.2.18 | 7 / 5 | |
| 4.2.17 | 7 / 5 | |
| 4.2.16 | 7 / 5 | |
| 4.2.15 | 7 / 5 |
v4.2.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.