@tcswap/wallet-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): New package in a small org; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a disqualifier here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.63 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.62 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.61 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.60 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.0.59 | 1 / 0 |
v4.0.63
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.