@teambit/api-reference.renderers.react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): davidfirst is a trusted long-standing publisher (258 approved, 0 rejected) within the teambit org; transition appears legitimate. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/api-reference.renderers.parameter | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* component; consistent with teambit's component publishing pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/api-reference.renderers.api-node-details | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* component; consistent with teambit's component publishing pattern. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Teambit component packages consistently omit descriptions; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Teambit packages do not use Sigstore provenance; consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is explicitly declared as a runtime dependency in package.json. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.69 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.68 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.67 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.66 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.65 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.62 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.61 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.60 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.59 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.58 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.57 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.56 | 6 / 8 |
v0.0.68
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.67
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.66
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.65
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.58
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.57
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.56
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.