@teambit/api-reference.renderers.type
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): teambit-owner is the established publisher with strong track record; learn-bit removal is a routine org cleanup. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped component package from teambit monorepo; missing description is a consistent pattern across their packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known runtime polyfill dependency; phantom-dep false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established teambit publisher; lack of provenance is consistent across their catalog and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.82 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.78 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.69 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.68 | 5 / 7 |
v0.0.82
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.69
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.68
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.