@teambit/api-reference.renderers.type-union
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.55 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.54 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.53 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.52 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.51 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.50 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.48 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.47 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.46 | 4 / 8 |
v0.0.55
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.54
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.53
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.52
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.51
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.46
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.