@teambit/api-reference.utils.group-schema-node-by-signature
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.45 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.44 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.43 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.42 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.41 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.40 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.39 | 2 / 4 |
v0.0.45
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.41
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.