@teambit/api-reference.utils.schema-node-signature-transform
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.47 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.46 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.45 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.44 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.43 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.42 | 1 / 3 |
v0.0.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.46
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.45
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.