@teambit/api-reference.utils.sort-api-nodes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.53 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.52 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.51 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.50 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.49 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.48 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.46 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.45 | 1 / 3 |
v0.0.53
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.52
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.51
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.50
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.49
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.48
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.46
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.45
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.