@teambit/component.ui.component-filters.show-main-filter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Teambit component packages consistently omit descriptions; not a malware signal for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Teambit packages do not use Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all their releases. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known polyfill implicit dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.237 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.236 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.235 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.234 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.233 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.231 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.230 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.229 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.228 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.226 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.225 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.224 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.223 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.222 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.221 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.220 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.219 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.218 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.217 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.216 | 5 / 8 | |
| 0.0.214 | 5 / 8 |
v0.0.228
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (teambit-owner) than the most recent previously approved version (davidfirst) on 2025-04-16, but teambit-owner is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.226
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.225
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.224
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.223
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.222
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.221
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.220
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.219
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.218
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.217
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.216
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.214
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.