@teambit/defender.ui.test-page
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/design.content.table | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit scoped package from the same trusted publisher ecosystem; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): teambit-owner is the org-level publisher for the teambit ecosystem; transition from individual davidfirst to org account is expected. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established teambit publisher; lack of provenance is consistent across all their packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Component-scoped package from teambit; missing description is a stable pattern for their component packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known polyfill runtime dep; phantom-dep false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.84 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.83 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.82 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.81 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.80 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.79 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.78 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.77 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.76 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.75 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.74 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.73 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.72 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.67 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.66 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.65 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.64 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.63 | 13 / 8 | |
| 0.0.62 | 13 / 8 |
v0.0.84
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.83
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.80
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.79
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.77
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.76
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.75
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.74
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.73
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.72
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.67
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.66
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.65
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.64
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.63
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.