@teambit/design.surfaces.selectable
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): teambit-owner is the org account for @teambit scope with strong approval history; publisher consolidation is expected. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Consistent with org-level account consolidation for @teambit packages. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by org account consolidation publish; no malicious code changes detected. | ai |
v0.0.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.25
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.