@teambit/express
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Routine maintainer rotation within the teambit org; stable pattern across many versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/legacy.logger | AI (dependencies): Internal teambit scoped dependency; consistent with the package's ecosystem and publisher history. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established teambit component package; missing description is a consistent pattern across the family, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Teambit packages consistently lack provenance attestation; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.1426 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1425 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1424 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1423 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1422 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1420 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1419 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1416 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1415 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1414 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1413 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1412 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1410 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1409 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1408 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1406 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1383 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1364 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1295 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1293 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1292 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1290 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1288 | 7 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1286 | 7 / 4 |
v0.0.1426
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1425
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1424
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1423
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1422
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1420
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1383
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1364
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1295
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1293
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1292
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1290
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1288
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1286
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.