@teambit/lanes.hooks.use-lanes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:teambit_lanes_hooks_use_lanes-component.js | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled build artifact from Bit's component compiler; sample is legit source-map lib code. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:teambit_lanes_hooks_use_lanes-component.js | AI (source-diff): Same bundled build file; no concrete malicious network/exec behavior found in sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Expected: bundled dist output for a UI hook component, consistent with sibling @teambit packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/base-react.navigation.link | AI (dependencies): First-party @teambit package, normal monorepo cross-dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Teambit publishes without Sigstore provenance; consistent across their package ecosystem. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known implicit polyfill dep; declared in package.json, not a phantom concern for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Teambit component packages routinely omit descriptions; stable pattern across this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.293 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.292 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.291 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.290 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.289 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.288 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.0.287 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.285 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.284 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.283 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.282 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.280 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.279 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.278 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.277 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.276 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.275 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.274 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.273 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.272 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.0.271 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.268 | 7 / 8 | |
| 0.0.267 | 6 / 8 | |
| 0.0.265 | 6 / 8 |
v0.0.287
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (teambit-owner) than the most recent previously approved version (davidfirst) on 2025-04-16, but teambit-owner is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.285
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.284
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.283
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.282
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.280
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.279
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.278
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.277
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.276
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.275
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (teambit-owner) than the most recent previously approved version (davidfirst) on 2024-12-05, but teambit-owner is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.274
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.273
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.272
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (teambit-owner) than the most recent previously approved version (davidfirst) on 2024-08-28, but teambit-owner is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.271
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.268
4 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (webpack) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (teambit-owner) than the most recent previously approved version (davidfirst) on 2024-08-27, but teambit-owner is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.267
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.265
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.