@teambit/lanes.modules.diff
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of learn-bit by established teambit-owner publisher; consistent with org-level maintainer cleanup, not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/legacy.constants | AI (dependencies): Internal teambit monorepo dependency; stable pattern across all @teambit/* packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/legacy.component-diff | AI (dependencies): Internal teambit monorepo dependency; stable pattern across all @teambit/* packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/harmony.modules.concurrency | AI (dependencies): Internal teambit monorepo dependency; stable pattern across all @teambit/* packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Teambit component packages routinely omit descriptions; stable false positive for this org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Teambit publishes without Sigstore provenance; consistent across all their packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.620 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.617 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.614 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.613 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.612 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.610 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.608 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.606 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.605 | 8 / 3 | |
| 0.0.583 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.0.554 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.0.550 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.0.549 | 6 / 3 | |
| 0.0.548 | 6 / 3 |
v0.0.620
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.617
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.613
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.612
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.610
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.583
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.554
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.550
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.549
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.548
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.