@teambit/lanes.ui.compare.lane-compare-page
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Teambit component packages consistently omit descriptions; stable false positive for this publisher. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Teambit packages do not use Sigstore provenance; consistent across all their releases. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.174 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.173 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.172 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.171 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.170 | 3 / 2 |
v0.0.174
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.173
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.172
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.171
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.170
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.