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@teambit/react.ui.docs.docs-content

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7
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

teambit-ownershohamgiladdavidfirstranm8guysaaritaymendelerezbitjoshk2redigmayona007

Keywords

bitcomponentscollaborationwebreactreact-componentsangularangular-components

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal aligns with org account consolidation; no malicious indicators present. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): teambit-owner is the org account for teambit with 258 approved packages; transition from individual to org account is expected. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:core-js AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known implicit/polyfill dep; stable false positive for this package. ai

Versions (showing 7 of 7)

Version Deps Published
0.0.41 6 / 6
0.0.40 6 / 6
0.0.39 6 / 6
0.0.38 6 / 6
0.0.37 6 / 6
0.0.36 6 / 6
0.0.35 6 / 6

v0.0.41

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.40

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.39

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: davidfirst → teambit-owner (on 2025-11-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.38

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: davidfirst → teambit-owner (on 2025-11-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.37

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: davidfirst → teambit-owner (on 2025-11-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.36

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.0.35

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.