@teambit/react.ui.highlighter-provider
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Teambit component packages routinely omit descriptions; not a malware indicator for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:core-js | AI (phantom-deps): core-js is a known implicit polyfill dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.220 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.219 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.218 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.217 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.0.216 | 4 / 8 |
v0.0.219
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.218
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.217
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.216
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.