@teambit/validator
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Monorepo package; description gaps are stable across Bit's internal packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance adoption is a CI/CD policy decision; not a per-version disqualifier for established publishers. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/logger | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/tester | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/harmony | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/cli | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo; unvetted status is a registry coverage gap, not a risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/workspace | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/typescript | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/legacy.constants | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/component | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/linter | AI (dependencies): Sibling @teambit/* package from the same teambit/bit monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 132)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.49 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.48 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.47 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.46 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.44 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.43 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.41 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.40 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.39 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.38 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.37 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.35 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.32 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.30 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.28 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.27 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.26 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.24 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.23 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.21 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.19 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.17 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.15 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.14 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.12 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.10 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.8 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.7 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.6 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 10 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 10 / 1 |
v0.0.49
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.48
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.47
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.