@teambit/webpack.modules.generate-style-loaders
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): davidfirst is a long-standing trusted publisher; maintainer rotation within teambit org is expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.26 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.25 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.24 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.23 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.22 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.0.21 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.20 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.0.19 | 0 / 4 |
v1.0.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.