@teambit/workspace
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): execa and git-executable are legitimate utilities for workspace git operations in this established package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@teambit/ui-foundation.ui.constants.z-indexes | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org phantom dep in a large monorepo package; stable false positive pattern for @teambit/* packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.995 | 114 / 11 | |
| 1.0.972 | 115 / 11 | |
| 1.0.971 | 115 / 11 | |
| 1.0.970 | 115 / 11 | |
| 1.0.969 | 115 / 11 | |
| 1.0.968 | 113 / 11 | |
| 1.0.926 | 113 / 11 | |
| 1.0.925 | 113 / 11 |
v1.0.995
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.972
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.971
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.970
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.969
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.926
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.