@tecsinapse/react-core
Core hybrid React components library
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Mature, established package; lack of provenance is consistent across all 192 versions and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.1 | 5 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 4.0.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.4.17 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.4.16 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.4.15 | 4 / 0 |
v4.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.