@tekir/runtime
Cross-runtime abstraction for Bun and Node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Intentional pattern in a spawn abstraction; merging process.env with caller env is standard and not malicious. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
3 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 41 | const proc = (globalThis as any).Bun.spawn(options.cmd, { 42 | cwd: options.cwd, > 43 | env: options.env ? { ...process.env, ...options.env } : process.env, 44 | stdout: options.stdout || 'pipe', 45 | stderr: options.stderr || 'pipe',
Spreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 60 | const proc: any = nodeSpawn(cmd, args, { 61 | cwd: options.cwd, > 62 | env: options.env ? { ...process.env, ...options.env } : process.env, 63 | stdio: [ 64 | 'ignore',
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.