@telegram-apps/bridge
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Telegram Mini Apps SDK; provenance absence is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.11.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 2.10.3 | 8 / 2 | |
| 2.10.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 2.10.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 2.10.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 2.9.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 2.8.3 | 8 / 2 |
v2.10.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.