@telepat/ideon
CLI for generating rich articles and images from ideas.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/preview/app-assets/index-BboniUbY.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled React preview app; minified output is expected for this package's build:preview step. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/preview/app-assets/index-8o7AqNZJ.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled React preview app output; minification is expected for this package's build:preview step. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/preview/app-assets/index-C9aRaijU.js | AI (source-diff): Vite-bundled React preview app; minified output is expected and consistent with build:preview script and declared deps. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:replicate | AI (phantom-deps): Declared runtime dep used in CLI integrations; phantom-dep is a false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-dom | AI (phantom-deps): Used in preview app (vite build); stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ant-design/icons | AI (phantom-deps): Transitive dependency of antd; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:antd | AI (phantom-deps): Used in preview app (vite build); stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.37 | 16 / 30 | |
| 0.1.35 | 16 / 29 | |
| 0.1.34 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.33 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.32 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.31 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.30 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.29 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.28 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.27 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.25 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.24 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.21 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.20 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.19 | 16 / 27 | |
| 0.1.18 | 15 / 27 | |
| 0.1.16 | 15 / 27 | |
| 0.1.15 | 15 / 27 | |
| 0.1.14 | 15 / 27 | |
| 0.1.13 | 15 / 27 | |
| 0.1.7 | 15 / 27 | |
| 0.1.6 | 14 / 27 | |
| 0.1.5 | 14 / 27 | |
| 0.1.0 | 14 / 27 |
v0.1.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.32
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.31
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.30
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.29
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.28
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.27
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.25
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.24
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.