@tenancy.nz/tenant-ui
React UI tenant components.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://www.tenancy.co.nz | AI (email-domain): Author field is a URL, not an email; analyzer misparses it as a domain. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.7.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.7.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.7.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.7.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.6.0 | 1 / 5 |
v1.7.4
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.3
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.7.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.7
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.6
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.5
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.4
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.3
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.2
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' uses domain 'https://www.tenancy.co.nz' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.