@the-neon/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @the-neon/core; name reflects its org/purpose, not a typosquat of cors. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
2 findingsPackage name '@the-neon/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.2
2 findingsPackage name '@the-neon/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsPackage name '@the-neon/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPackage name '@the-neon/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.