@theia/ai-anthropic
Theia - Anthropic Integration
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Eclipse Theia monorepo does not publish with Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| license | weak-copyleft-license:EPL-2.0 | AI (license): Standard Eclipse project license; stable across all Theia packages. | ai | |
| license | copyleft-license:GPL-2.0-only | AI (license): Standard Eclipse dual-license (EPL-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-only WITH Classpath-exception-2.0); stable for this package. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:Classpath-exception-2.0 | AI (license): Classpath exception is part of the standard Eclipse dual-license; stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 49 of 49)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.73.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.73.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.69.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.68.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.68.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.68.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.67.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.66.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.66.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.66.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.65.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.4 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.61.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.61.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.60.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.60.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.60.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.59.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.5 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.4 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.57.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.57.0 | 3 / 1 |
v1.73.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.70.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (ndoschek) on 2025-10-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (ndoschek) on 2025-10-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.65.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-26, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-12, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.62.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-05-28, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.61.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-06-11, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.61.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.60.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.59.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (tsmaeder) on 2025-02-27, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (tsmaeder) on 2025-03-05, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (tsmaeder) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-02-17, but tsmaeder is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.57.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.57.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.