@theia/plugin-dev
Theia - Plugin Development Extension
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): New publisher has strong track record (1379 approved/0 rejected); likely org-managed transition. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same maintainer-transition context as publisher-changed; not indicative of compromise. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Passing process.env to child plugin process is expected behavior for an IDE plugin host manager. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/core | AI (dependencies): Same-version sibling package from the eclipse-theia monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/debug | AI (dependencies): Same-version sibling package from the eclipse-theia monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Theia plugin-dev legitimately spawns hosted plugin instances as child processes; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/workspace | AI (dependencies): Same-version sibling package from the eclipse-theia monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/filesystem | AI (dependencies): Same-version sibling package from the eclipse-theia monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/plugin-ext | AI (dependencies): Same-version sibling package from the eclipse-theia monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/output | AI (dependencies): Same-version sibling package from the eclipse-theia monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-spawn | AI (semgrep): Spawning hosted plugin instances is core functionality of this package; not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 62)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.73.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.73.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.72.3 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.72.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.72.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.72.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.71.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.71.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.71.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.70.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.70.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.70.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.69.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.68.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.68.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.68.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.67.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.66.2 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.66.1 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.66.0 | 7 / 1 | |
| 1.65.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.65.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.65.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.64.4 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.64.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.64.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.64.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.64.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.63.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.63.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.63.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.63.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.62.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.62.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.62.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.61.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.61.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.60.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.60.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.60.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.59.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.58.5 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.58.4 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.58.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.58.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.58.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.58.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.57.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.57.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.56.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 1.55.1 | 8 / 1 |
v1.73.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.70.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.69.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (eclipse-theia-bot) on 2026-01-29, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.67.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (eclipse-theia-bot) on 2025-12-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.66.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-10-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-10-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.65.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-26, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-12, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-03, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.61.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.61.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.60.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.59.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (tsmaeder) on 2025-02-27, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (tsmaeder) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-02-17, but tsmaeder is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.57.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.57.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2024-12-16, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.56.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.55.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.