@theia/property-view
Theia - Property View Extension
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Theia is an established Eclipse project; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): ndoschek is a known Theia project contributor; addition consistent with legitimate project maintainer expansion. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): ndoschek is a verified eclipse-theia org maintainer with 221 approved packages; publisher rotation within the org is expected. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/core | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo dependency released in lockstep; not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/filesystem | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo dependency released in lockstep; not an independent risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 62)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.73.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.73.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.69.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.68.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.68.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.68.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.67.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.66.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.66.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.66.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.4 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.61.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.61.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.60.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.60.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.60.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.59.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.5 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.4 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.58.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.57.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.57.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.56.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.55.1 | 3 / 1 |
v1.73.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.70.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.69.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (ndoschek) on 2025-10-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (ndoschek) on 2025-10-14, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.65.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-26, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-12, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-06-03, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.62.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-05-28, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.61.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.61.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.60.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.59.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (tsmaeder) on 2025-02-27, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (tsmaeder) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2025-02-17, but tsmaeder is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.58.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.58.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.57.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.57.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2024-12-16, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.56.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sgraband) than the most recent previously approved version (jfaltermeier) on 2024-11-28, but sgraband is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.55.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.