@theia/typehierarchy
Theia - Type Hierarchy Extension
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): ndoschek is an established Theia project maintainer with 849 approved packages; publisher rotation within the Theia org is expected. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): ndoschek is an established eclipse-theia org contributor with 837 approved packages; maintainer rotation is expected in this monorepo. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Eclipse Theia monorepo does not publish with Sigstore provenance; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/core | AI (dependencies): Sibling dep in the same Eclipse Theia monorepo release; versioned in lockstep, not an independent risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@theia/editor | AI (dependencies): Sibling dep in the same Eclipse Theia monorepo release; versioned in lockstep, not an independent risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.72.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.72.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.71.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.70.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.69.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.68.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.68.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.68.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.67.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.66.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.66.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.66.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.65.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.4 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.64.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.3 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.63.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.62.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.61.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.61.0 | 3 / 1 |
v1.72.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.72.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.72.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.71.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.70.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.69.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.68.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.67.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.66.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-11-10, but eclipse-theia-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.66.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-11-07, but eclipse-theia-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.66.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-10-30, but eclipse-theia-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (eclipse-theia-bot) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-10-14, but eclipse-theia-bot is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.65.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.65.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.64.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.63.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.62.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.62.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.62.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-05-28, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.61.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jfaltermeier) than the most recent previously approved version (sgraband) on 2025-06-11, but jfaltermeier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.61.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.