@things-factory/aws-base
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Fires in a migrations file-loader that requires local resolved paths — standard pattern for this monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.2.24 | 4 / 0 | |
| 9.2.19 | 4 / 0 | |
| 9.0.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 9.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 9.0.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 8.0.63 | 4 / 0 |
v9.2.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.63
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.