@things-factory/fav-base
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org-level maintainer rotation in a large monorepo; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Consistent with org restructuring; no suspicious code changes accompany the removal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with 962 versions; lack of provenance is consistent across its history and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.2.24 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.2.19 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.2.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.2.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.1.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.41 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.34 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.25 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.20 | 1 / 0 | |
| 9.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.0.87 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.0.86 | 1 / 0 | |
| 8.0.64 | 1 / 0 | |
| 4.3.815 | 1 / 0 |
v9.2.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.2.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.1.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (nalshya113) than the most recent previously approved version (heartyoh) on 2025-10-22, but nalshya113 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v9.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.87
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v8.0.86
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.64
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.815
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.