@thzero/library_id_nanoid
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.18.18 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.18.17 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.18.16 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.18.15 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.18.13 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.18.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.18.10 | 1 / 0 |
v0.18.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.