@tinkoff/dippy
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.13.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.13.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.12.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.12.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.12.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.12.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.11.11 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.11.10 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.11.7 | 1 / 0 |
v0.13.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.